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Research Publications
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Mexico's Distribution Infrastructure for Fresh Deciduous Fruits After the North American Free Trade Agreement
by
Dr. Juan C. Batista,
Lic. Jose Armando Martinez
and
Antonio Soto
Empirical Findings
CATI Publication #960301
© Copyright February 1996, all rights reserved
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Survey Techniques
Data and information for this study were collected over the course of a year beginning in Fall of 1994 by surveying industry participants involved in the trade of fresh fruits between Mexico and the United States, secondary data sources,
and trade periodicals. Secondary data sources and trade periodicals are referenced throughout the text whenever information from these sources is cited.
Choosing a sample was not a simple matter because it is difficult to identify the population from which to select a sample. Emphasis was placed on interviewing "major players" in the marketplace. These were firms, associations and
agencies which have shown longevity and success in their enterprise(s). Fifty one Mexican and 12 U.S. agents were interviewed. The names of the persons representing the enterprise are not disclosed in order to maintain confidentiality. Rather, the types of businesses, agencies,
and associations that participated in the survey appear in Table 10.
Interviews were conducted in person or by telephone. The questionnaire in Appendix B was not administered directly because it was too formal a format. According to Batista and Hagen (1994), the formality of asking the questions
verbatim only solicits reservations in the respondents. In order to get the most insightful answers, responses and comments, the questionnaire was used only as a guideline from which to have a discussion with the persons interviewed.
This informal approach turns out to be quite useful in that many insightful tangents are uncovered. The discussions allowed respondents a greater degree of latitude in their answers and comments, which add to obtaining an understanding of the operations of the infrastructure.
This approach differs somewhat from the more conventional surveys that use dichotomous, multiple-choice, and/or
likert-scale questions. As a result, quantitative data were seldom not generated. Instead, the responses represent a qualitative description
of Mexico's infrastructure.
The results and conclusions are grouped into the same seven categories used in Batista and Hagen's 1994 study for the purpose of comparison. However, two new categories are added. Thus, the nine categories are mode of transportation,
time in transit, cost of transportation, border crossings and customs, trade protocol, quality of fruit, facilities, infrastructure improvements, and devaluation of the peso and trade flows. Comparisons to the results Batista and Hagen uncovered are made throughout the following text.
Mode of Transportation
There are four modes of transportation to ship fruit into Mexico: truck, airplane, steamship and/or railroad. In general, the American Trucking Association (1995) notes that over 82 percent of total freight tons moved in Mexico moves by truck, 11 percent
moves by rail and seven percent by ocean, with only 0.2 percent by air. Each mode of transportation is discussed in greater detail separately next.
Trucking:
According to Foreign Trade magazine (June 1995), "about 85 percent of goods shipped between Mexico and the United States is via truck." However, according to the respondents, 90 percent or more of fresh fruit entering Mexico
from the United States arrives by truck, using refrigerated containers. This figure does not differ by much from the results discovered by Batista and Hagen for 1993.
In the last year or so, the industry has finally seen an improvement in the availability of refrigerated containers. The deficiency in cold storage was a concern expressed back when Batista and Hagen studied the movement of apples
and pears. The respondents attribute this favorable change to the Mexican government's six-year effort to deregulate, invest in and improve the system for transporting cargo by ground. The programs, in other words, are just now starting to
show results and therefore more companies are willing to provide refrigerated-container service.
The common carrier fleet in Mexico has grown significantly since deregulation back in 1989. The fleet has grown 91 percent since 1989. Today there are a reported 3,880 motor transport common carriers in Mexico (American Trucking
Association 1995). Of those companies, only eight have more than 500 vehicles, the average carrier having 78 units. Over half the Mexican truck fleet predates 1980.
Nearly all carriers in Mexico are truckload carriers. The less-than-truckload
(LTL) industry in Mexico was virtually nonexistent until recently. The advent of the NAFTA has spurred alliances between many U.S. LTL operations and Mexican carriers to create
Mexican LTL enterprises (American Trucking Association 1995).
The NAFTA has made other significant changes in the international shipment of cargo among parties to the agreement. On December 17, 1995, cross-border freight pickups and deliveries were allowed, according to the
NAFTA, for international shipments within
the border states of the U.S. for Mexican trucking firms and Mexican border states for U.S. firms.
Recognizing, however, that U.S. truckers are currently not permitted to transport or deliver freight into Mexico, merchandise is transshipped to a Mexican carrier within a U.S. commercial zone at the border. This transfer of cargo is covered under either
an interline or interchange agreement.
An interline agreement established a working relationship between a U.S. carrier and a Mexican one that provides joint line service on transborder shipments by transloading freight at the border. An interline agreement encompasses the following: division
of rates between the carriers; responsibility for providing certain services; responsibility for loss, damage, and delay claims; responsibility for taxes, customs duties, insurance, and compliance laws regarding safety; licensing and qualification of equ
ipment and drivers; and liability to third parties. Officially, interline agreements need to be preapproved by the Secretari de Comunicaciones y
Transportes.
A U.S. carrier also has the option of entering into an interchange agreement, where equipment will be lent to a Mexican carrier at the owner's discretion. In an interchange agreement, freight is transferred from one carrier to the other by an exchange of
the loaded trailer for delivery to the final destination. In Mexico, the interchange agreement is referred to as the
commodatum. This type of agreement specifies the responsibilities and duties of each carrier regarding receipt and return of the equipmen
t, taxes and liability to third parties, and damage to equipment. It generally includes an inspection report. The U.S. government is working with the Mexican government to harmonize standards for vehicle sizes and weights. However, during the NAFTA negoti
ations, Mexico agreed to designate a system of highways to allow 53-foot trailers. In June 1994, Mexico designated these highways, but with an overall length restriction too restrictive for many. The U.S. government is working to change the overall length
limits (American Trucking Association 1995).
Mexico published size and weight regulations in November 1994. The regulations stated that maximum weight and overall length are based on axle and road type. Tractor semi-trailer combinations and double trailer combinations, as well as straight trucks an
d trailer trucks, are allowed on Mexican roads. Specifications for vehicle length, width, height and weight in the U.S. and Mexico for common U.S. configurations are detailed in Table 11. These measurements, according to the American Trucking Association
(1995), were accurate at the time of publication - early 1995 - and provide a comparison across the trading partners. Changes are anticipated in the measurements as standards are harmonized in North America.
It has long been reported - see Batista and Hagen (1994) - that Mexican officials have not enforced weight limits. Roadside scales are virtually nonexistent. As Mexico modernizes its infrastructure, officials are expected to begin more careful monitoring
for overloaded vehicles that damage new roads.
Joint ventures are developing between U.S. and Mexican trucking firms to deliver smooth and continuous service from the U.S. into and through to Mexico. The joint ventures center on the mutual benefits by combining technology,
equipment, terminals and knowledge of the marketplace and customs procedures. Currently, the NAFTA allows up to 49 percent ownership by U.S. or Canadian interests of Mexican trucking firms that only operate internationally. By the year 2004, the agreement will allow full ownership,
but again for firms doing business only internationally (Foreign Trade 1995).
In short, there are very few differences, since the study by Batista and Hagen, in using trucks to ship fresh fruit into and out of Mexico. It is still the dominate mode of transportation and will continue to be for at least the near future. Rail was the
mode of transportation gaining use in shipping into Mexico at the time Batista and Hagen finished their study. Rail service and the changes in the service are discussed next.
Rail:
Some apples from the Pacific Northwest enter Mexico by rail. According to The Packer (July 24, 1995), "...the first direct shipment of Washington apples to Mexico left Kennewick in mid-July (1995) filled with 2,000 boxes...." This service was set up to
avoid delays at border crossings by going directly into Monterrey.
Rail service is an economical way to move fresh fruit as long as there are substantial volumes. Although it is uncertain what impact the devaluation of the peso had on specific volumes of apples or other fresh fruit into Mexico, it
is likely the volume has decreased. It would appear the decreases in volume that resulted from the devaluation will have a negative impact on rail service.
Most respondents claimed they are not using rail because "...service is risky due to the inefficiency of the service." Inefficiency refers to the timeliness of the service, which is very important in shipping perishable fresh
fruits. Nevertheless, considerable investment is going toward the infrastructure supporting rail service in Mexico. Partnerships and agreements between U.S. railroads and Mexico's national railroad. The goal for these working relations is to create a seamless cross-border transport
ation system as soon as possible. For example, plans are in the works for a pre-clearance center in Laredo, Texas so that rail cars can enter Mexico immediately instead of waiting at the border on tracks (Foreign Trade May 1995).
Steamship Lines:
Ocean service from the U.S. is done by the Mexican steamship line, Transportation Maritima
Mexicana, S.A. de C.V. (Marmex). The findings here are not at all different from those findings in Batista and Hagen. That is, the cost of
shipping is relatively inexpensive but the length of time in transit and the regularity of the service makes this mode of transportation unattractive, at present, for fresh fruits.
Two noteworthy partnerships would impact the movement of fresh fruit by ship from the U.S. to Mexico. Transportation Martitima Mexicana
(TMM), Maruba Line, and an Argentina carrier are initiating the first all-water service between
Vancouver, British Columbia and Manzanillo, with an intervening stop in Long Beach, California. The ships will also call at
Ensenada, Lozaro, Cardenas and Santa Cruz. Maruba will carry cargoes from Vancouver to Long Beach where they will interline with TMM
(Beilock et al. 1995).
Also geared to take advantage of deciduous fruit movement to Mexico, Dole has announced its intentions to initiate service between Long Beach and
Manzanillo. Fruit from the pacific Northwest will be trucked to Long Beach and then
shipped to Manzanillo (Beilock et al. 1995).
Shipments of fresh fruit imported from other countries arrive by sea. Fresh fruits from Chile, for instance, arrive mostly through the Port of
Manzanillo. Loads arrive either containerized or palletized bulk. Loads are transferred
at the port from the vessel to a truck and sent to the Central de Abasto in Mexico City. It takes approximately the same length of time to unload a ship regardless of way the load arrives.
Air Cargo:
Air as an alternative to shipping fresh fruit is too expensive. For this reason, respondents did not provide information on this mode of transportation. A few respondents claimed they received samples by air, but this was seldom.
The value of the cargo needs to be more than that inherent in fresh fruits for air to become a viable alternative. It does not seem that their value will change sufficiently soon. Moreover, the devaluation of the peso will certainly impact the mode negatively for these commodities.
Time in Transit
The results found in this study concerning time in transit are consistent with those reported in Batista and Hagen. It takes just under a week to ship fruit by truck from the United States to Mexico. It takes two to three days to truck cargo to the borde
r and about the same number of days from the border into the Republic of Mexico.
Rail shipments take an average of seven to nine days to arrive in Mexico City from the Pacific Northwest according to Batista and Hagen. Since so few persons interviewed used rail as a mode of importing fresh fruit, no one ventured
an estimate on the time in transit using rail. Based on an article in The Packer (July 1995), direct rail service to Monterrey should be faster than the aforementioned times because the service was designed specifically to overcome this particular shortcoming, which has been a
complaint with rail service since Batista and Hagen started their study back in 1992. Rail should be as timely as trucks especially during peak (apple) season (The Packer 1995).
Ocean freight was never used by those interviewed so no information or data were collect on time in transit for shipments by sea.
Costs of Transport
According to Beilock et al. (1995), "... the Mexican motor carrier industry has been effectively deregulated" (p.61). They claim deregulation has, among other things, lowered trucking rates by one third in real terms. Evidence of
their finding was not found in this study, however. The results obtained here were at best ambiguous, although there is evidence to suggest rates increased for fresh fruit. This would make some sense since the trade of fresh fruit
increased dramatically in 1994 up until the devaluation of the peso in December of the year.
Respondents claimed the cost for transporting a box of fruit from the United States varies depending on the fruit and the variety. The range given for this cost was between $10 to $15 per box. This is higher than the average cost of $7 per box stated in
Batista and Hagen's study. Both sets of estimates seem high according to an article in The Packer (July 1995) that stated "shippers pay up to $4 per box in trucking fees during peak sales season, and around $2 when business is slow." Costs can be lowered
if the trucking firm can arrange to return with a container load; that is, some companies charge their clients a premium if a return load cannot be arranged. For this reason it pays to shop alternative trucking companies.
Of course, trucking cost is somewhat lower if the cargo does not have to be transloaded at the border; but this is seldom the case. It was estimated the average cost of transloading a load at the border is $400. This is higher than
the cost of around $200 stated in Batista and Hagen back in 1993. This discrepancy can be attributed to several factors: Demand for transloading has increased as a result of the additional volumes that pass through the border during 1994;
The respondents were not well informed of the exact costs because other parties handled paying the cost; Costs for providing the services have gone up; And/or reference to very specific circumstances rather than the general cases, such as,
the case of apples being shipped from a designated locality in the state of Washington to a facility in Monterrey, Mexico.
Rail costs were difficult to ascertain. Batista and Hagen found an estimate of $3 per box to move fresh fruit by rail. This estimate is supported by an article in The Packer (July 1995) that claims rail service at an around $2.90 per box is competitive
with trucking. These estimates are comparable because in both cases the shipment being referenced is apples from the Pacific Northwest to Monterrey, Mexico via a specific railroad line.
No estimates for the cost of flying fruit into Mexico were obtained. No one could quote a cost - the costs of air freight must be too expensive relative to market prices received for the deciduous fruits under consideration.
Border Crossing and Customs
Since the majority of cargo passes into Mexico by truck, it is important to see and understand what is known as the "frontier zone." This is the zone along the U.S.-Mexican border that extends 26 kilometers on each side of the border;
it is shown in Figure 11. Currently, a U.S. carrier with freight bound for Mexico must exchange its trailer with a Mexican carrier at the border (interchanging) or transload the freight into a Mexican trailer (interlining), as illustrated
in Figure 11. The Mexican carrier then brings the trailer of freight into Mexico for delivery.
U.S. commercial zones, established by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), allow a Mexican motor carrier to operate without obtaining an ICC license. The zones are established by a population/mileage formula, which is a
specific geographic description that extends municipal limits or specific contiguous areas of commercial activity.
The quickest way to enter Mexico by truck is through Texas. Texas provides many advantages over other entry points. Access through Texas has more Mexican inspectors to expedite border crossings, direct access to a network of quality roads in Mexico, and
a number of up-to-date facilities at the border. The city of Laredo, Texas is the busiest crossing. According to the American Trucking Association (1995), approximately 55 percent of all trucking activity to and from Mexico occurs at the
port of Laredo. The border crossing scenario described above and the corresponding protocol applied to all shipments entering by truck.
The ocean ports of Veracruz on the Gulf side of Mexico and Manzanillo on the Pacific side are the two most often used to import fruit that arrives by sea. These ports are mainly used to import fresh fruit from countries other than
the U.S. The agents interviewed claim both ports have excellent facilities. Not one respondent eluded to corruption in the ports as was the case back when Batista and Hagen conducted a similar query.
Trade Protocol
Clearing customs essentially rests on proper documentation and paying fees and duties. Three documents are required for the importation of fruit into Mexico: a bill of lading (required of all cargo), a certificate of origin, and a
phyto-sanitary certificate. The responsibility for having documents in order and paying duties and fees basically falls on the importer. However, it is everyone's interest to insure the "paper work" is fulfilled satisfactorily and expediently.
For the fruits in question, currently there is a "zero-tolerance" regulation as far as health and
phyto-sanitary standards. Zero tolerance means free of all foreign matter including leaves, dirt, pests, diseases, etc. In addition,
there are special procedures that must be followed for specific commodities. For example, apples must receive cold treatment at zero degrees Celsius for 40 days or 3.3 degrees Celsius for 90 days. And, other fruits such as peaches, plums and nectarines must receive
post-harve
st treatment with methyl bromide. U.S. companies planning to export to Mexico should check with their regional APHIS office for specific information.
The origin of the fruit is important. There are certain counties in the United States that are prohibited from exporting locally grown fruits. Quarantines have been placed on these counties by the Mexican government as a result of
the existence of foreign matter and/or pests arising in loads from these areas. For instance, pears from Los Angeles and Santa Clara counties are prohibited because of the detection of the Mediterranean Fruit Fly in the counties.
As mentioned above, customs at the border operates under a "red-light, green-light" system. Whereas a "green light" shipment can be processed across the border in less than three hours for about $100 per trailer, a "red light"
inspection can mean a delay of up to three days and a substantial increase in costs, due primarily to the need to warehouse the cargo at a cost of $30 for the first hour of refrigerated storage and $20 for each additional hour. "Documents
must be 100% complete and arrive with the shipment..." is the message contained in an article in Export Today (July 1995). Missing paperwork or discrepancies trigger a "red light," which guarantees a 100% inspection. This situation is
relatively more costly for rail transportation because a sing le error, for example, can lead to a red light for all the containers on the same bill of lading.
One improvement in the infrastructure that was not in place when Batista and Hagen did their study is a recently-introduced automated system that "...permits on-line filing of entries and uses bar coding to track and clear
cargo.... The system at present is limited to the Mexico City airport and the customs office in Nuevo Laredo..." (Export Today, July 1995, p. 36).
In Mexico, the Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos (SARH) publishes the official registry that details the regulations on importing fresh fruit into Mexico. Under an agreement between SARH and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the
USDA's phytosanitary certificates suffice for purpose of importation.
Each party to the NAFTA-negotiated tariff schedules for the commodities they trade with each other. The agreement states the agreed-upon tariff schedules for each country and commodity. Customs is charged with collecting the duties.
General schedules were presented above and exact tariffs can be identified with the assistance of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System.
Quality of Fruit
Batista and Hagen discovered Mexican marketing agents complained about the quality of fruit being exported to Mexico. More specifically, the study found Mexican importers claiming U.S. shippers sending lower quality fruit to Mexico
compared to fruits being exported to the European and Asian markets. These complaints were not expressed during the interviews this time. The reason for this is most likely that Mexico has since become a very large and important market for
U.S. fruits. In the course of the two years since Batista and Hagen did their study, Mexico ranked no lower than third among world markets for fresh fruits.
The Mexican consumer likes the large sizes and top grades; however, the market also takes smaller sizes in order to pay the corresponding lower price (The Packer May 1995). In addition, the Mexican market should continue to ask for
a sweeter commodity. Mexicans traditionally like their fresh fruits quite sweet.
One difference from the past study is the packaging of fruit. Fresh fruits are being packed in cardboard boxes more often than before, when fruit was packed mostly in wooden crates.
Market Channels and Facilities
All respondents indicated they import fruits from the U.S. In the last study, there were some participants who solely handled Mexican-grown fruits. This suggests the Mexican market realizes the benefits of being involved in year-round marketing and sales
. Seventy five to 80 percent of the imported fruits goes through Mexico City's Central de Abasto - the central wholesale market. The remaining volume of fruit is imported equally through Monterrey and Guadalajara.
Wholesalers import approximately 85 percent of the fresh fruit. Retail chains import five percent directly and the remaining is imported by other retailers and/or their agents.
The Mexican marketplace does not have much access to less-than-truckload shipments.
The one thing Batista and Hagen found back at the end of 1993 that was considered a major impediment to additional imports of fresh fruits was the shortage of cold storage. Apparently that shortcoming has been overcome or at least
lessened. No one mentioned a shortage of refrigerated warehouse space. Ninety percent of those interviewed claimed to own or have access to refrigerated storage. Apparently investment into cold storage was one of the major steps taken by
the trade since Batista and Hagen completed their study. Not one respondent complained about a shortage of cold storage; whereas Batista and Hagen found many complaints in their last study (Albeit, statistics were not available and/or
reliable to substitute at this point). The investments must have seemed reasonable given the increasing imports Mexico had experienced since 1993. Unfortunately, the expansion was debt financed and the resulting slow-down in trade from the
devaluation of the peso has caught many enterprises unable to service their heavily-leveraged positions.
At Mexico City's Central de Abasto there is approximately 1,500 metric tons of refrigerated storage capacity. This figure represents nearly 10 percent of total warehouse space at the central wholesale market.
The last update in Mexico's storage infrastructure is the construction of a one million square foot intermodal facility in San Luis Potosi, a city centrally located in the Republic. The plan is to make San Luis Potosi a warehouse and distribution center
for the country.
Infrastructure Improvements
According to Andres Cones Ruiz, vice president of Grupo ICA, Mexico's largest construction company, Mexico's infrastructure needs include the following:
- Some 1,100 miles of new railways
- Revitalization of most existing ports and construction of three new ports
- Thousands of miles of new highways.
- Power and waste water treatment plants (Export Today March 1995)
One example of an improvement is the need to build a second airport in Mexico City (although it will not necessarily help the fruit trade). It is estimated that a second airport will be needed within the next five years at a cost of
some $6 billion. Another example is the construction of new highways because, as has been observed, "...there are not as many four-lane highways as are needed..." (Export Today July 1995). Once Mexico makes these upgrades, the logistics
of U.S.-Mexican trade will be radically
different than today. The question is how will the country pay for the improvements.
In 1994, Mexico planned on spending $16 billion on infrastructure programs. This represents an 18-percent increase over 1993. The plan calls for the government to provide $5 billion of the total amount, while the private sector has
pledged to raise the additional $11 billion. The majority of the funds were to be spent in building new highways (American Trucking Association 1995).
Much of the road development continues to be accomplished through government concessions to contractors from the private sector. Through agreements with the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y
Transportes, companies have been able to
lease public property, make improvements, charge user fees, and return the property to the government in its improved conditions. In many of these plans to modernize, foreign interests have played an integral role. Up to 49 percent foreign
participation is allowed in highway construction. This figure can be increased to 100 percent with a permit from the National Commission for Foreign Investment. After 1999, a permit will not be required for 100 percent participation. Most
Mexican carriers, however, refuse to use the newly constructed toll roads because they are too expensive. The tolls range from a low of 35 cents per mile to a high of 90 cents per mile. To place these costs in perspective, the toll on the
newest 16-mile toll road from Chamapa to Lecheria in central Mexico is 26 pesos, or about $7.50 back in November of 1994. This amount is nearly double the daily minimum wage for workers in the region (The Fresno Bee, November 1994).
Mexican regulators have been trying to devise a plan to require at least certain carriers, such as hazardous materials carriers, to use the new highways. In the meantime, the Mexican government has extended the 20-year amortization
of the cost to build the roads to 30 years and plans to lower the tolls. Between 1995 and the year 2000, Mexico's national highway program has slated another $15 billion in investments in developing 3,750 additional miles of new roads.
Devaluation of the Peso and Trade Flows
Purpose and Objectives
Whether or not these programs will progress as planned is uncertain. The devaluation of the peso back in December 1994 has clouded the picture. Some feel the economic slowdown will allow Mexico more time to make the much needed
infrastructure improvements. On the other hand, a downturn in the economy could also translate into fewer funds to make the necessary investments.
The slowdown in economic growth in Mexico, and the weaker peso, will reduce U.S. exports and increase U.S. imports of both agricultural and non-agricultural products.
DRI/McGraw-Hill estimates total U.S. exports to Mexico will be $9 million lower in 1995
than a year earlier and $3 billion lower in 1996 (Export Today July 1995). U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico and imports from Mexico are both expected to be worth $3.2 billion in calendar year 1995. After a half year of adjusting to a
radically new economic environment, North American transportation companies now report that the disruption was not nearly as bad as feared (Export Today July 1995).
The impact of the peso devaluation on agriculture is going to differ by commodity. For deciduous fruit "...Mexico is a major question mark...," according to David Miller of the California Tree fruit Agreement. "Access to the market
still was uncertain as of mid-April (1995) as concern over the country's phytosanitary requirements still was looming. Beyond that, the country's ability to be a major purchaser of fruit this season was in question because of the
devaluation of the peso" (The Packer May 1995). In an article in The Packer (May 1995), Rob O'Rourke, sales representative of RJO Produce Distributing, said he saw his company's fruit exports to Mexico drop by 50 percent since the
devaluation. In addition, shippers are being more cautious to insure payment as a result of Mexico's economic hardships. For instance, Brian Forrest, director of North American marketing for Cal Harvest Marketing, Inc., noted they would
probably only do business through letters of credit if they ship to Mexico.
The devaluation has resulted in change in the business practices of fresh fruit importers in Mexico. First, respondents claim their fresh-fruit import business as a percentage of total business has decreased. Before December 1994, importers estimated the
ir import sales comprised approximately 50 to 60 percent of total sales. After the devaluation, the import portion dropped to near 25 percent of total sales. Second, the devaluation must have impacted total volume, because many importers
expanded their operations between 1993 and 1994, mainly by adding refrigerated storage. Their expansions were leveraged and the resulting slowdown in volume has left many importers suffering the lack of liquidity to service their relatively high debt positions. Third, Mexicans shopped around, from shed to shed, looking for the best deal and often bought second grade fruit.
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